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ABSTRACT 
The note outlines institutional features of an open outcry market that pennit multiple unit 
or "block" trades. The purpose of the note is to introduce the process as a tool to be used in 
economics experiments. The detailed rules governing the multiple unit double auction (MUDA) 
are stated for the case where offers are tendered by voice as opposed to through a computer. The 
results of markets that use the rules are reported as a demonstration that convergence to equilibrium 
price traditionally observed in experimental markets remains with the use of the MUDA process. 
THE MULTIPLE UNIT DOUBLE AUCTION 
Charles R. Plott* and Peter Gray 
California Institute of Technology 
This note is limited to a discussion of a market instrument which was designed for 
experimental economics. The institutional features of a new market process are outlined. The 
process, which is called the multiple unit double auction (MUDA) pennits multiple unit or "block" 
trades in the framework of a double auction. Because the process allows volume to move faster 
than the single unit counterparts, it allows researchers greater flexibility in experimental design. 
The single unit double auction (DA) has been an important tool for the development of an 
experimental methodology and it has also served as a background "constant" against which 
institutional influences on market perfonnance could be measured. The MUDA has the same 
potential as serving as a background process that operates in real t.ime to clear large volumes. 
Within the traditional DA organization, markets with large volumes1 and many traders are 
difficult to study. A primary feature of the traditional DA is that both buyers and sellers tender bids 
and asks for a single unit of the commodity. Such tenders stand until accepted, canceled, or 
replaced by a better bid or ask. In computerized versions of the traditional double auction, 
confinnation of trades is required. Thus, the market proceeds as a series of auctions for single 
units. In each auction bids ascend and asks decline until a contract (acceptance) occurs. Typically, 
in an oral double auction market, approximately thirty seconds per unit of equilibrium volume is 
the time allowed for a market period. The time is cut to a minimum of eight seconds per 
equilibrium trade in computerized versions with a standby queue. Since each traded unit is 
accompanied by bids and asks, the time used for trading will vary according to the number of 
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traders and the number of units each trader attempts to move. The time allocated to move a large 
volume of units in a given period reduces the number of periods that markets can be opened due to 
the practical constraint on subjects' time for participation. The purpose of the multiple unit double 
auction introduced here is to facilitate studies in which large volumes are an important feature. 
Many experiments would benefit from a real time process that can move large quantities 
rapidly. (1) Small numbers of units can cause rather severe discoptinuities in incentive functions 
held by individual subjects. The discontinuities can induce the existence of unwanted (local) 
equilibria. The capacity to move large volumes gives greater flexibility in experimental design to 
"smooth out" the incentive functions. (2) Frequently studies require the separation of theories in 
terms of equilibrium quantities. If the total number of units per period must be "small" then the
separation is "small" relative to natural noise. (3) Studies of multiple interdependent markets 
frequently involve agents who wish to trade rapidly to secure a position in one market while an
opportunity exists in another market If trading is slow, the operation of a multiple market system 
is affected. ( 4) . If a market has multiple equilibria, those requiring high volume will not be
observed if the period is not sufficiently long. However, if the period is very long, the propensity of 
subjects to play to relieve boredom might bias the process in favor of the large volume equilibria. 
(5) Studies in which information becomes available during a period need the capacity for large 
volumes due to before-release volume and after-release volume. Other reasons may exist but these 
seem sufficiently important to justify the introduction of a possible solution to the real time volume 
problem. 
Various means of increasing volume can be imagined. At least three different features of
institutions are readily apparent. (1) Each bid/ask can be accompanied by a quantity. This reduces 
the number of tenders that must be made by each agent in order to move a given volume. Since 
tenders require time, the time needed to move a given volume is reduced. (2) Bids/asks can be 
entered into a "book" and automatically pulled to the floor after a contract is made. This allows 
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"slack time" to be utilized to make tenders that would otherwise be precluded by the floor tender.2
(3) Replaced tenders can go back to the book if a book is maintained. This eliminates the need to 
repeat a tender after it has been exposed to the floor and replaced by a better tender. This is similar 
to a "bulletin board" market.3 (4) More than one market can be open for the same commodity.
This allows more than one bid/ask to occupy the floor at the same time similar to security markets 
in which more than one specialist deals in a single security. This paper deals with only the first of 
these four possibilities. 
The study has four brief parts. The first is devoted to a documentation of the institutional 
details for experimenters. The second part demonstrates two important features of the process: 
(1) markets organized by MUDA will converge to the competitive equilibrium; and (2) units can 
move at speeds considered impossible under the single unit double auction. The concluding section 
contains remarks and observations that can be of use to experimenters. 
How does the process compare with other processes that have the capacity to allow 
multiple unit trades such as the sealed bid-offer, posted prices, or tiitonnement? How does the 
process compare with the single unit double auction? How do special institutional features like 
computerization, standby queues, tie breaking rules, or the method of market access (voice or 
recognition by the auctioneer) impact on comparative behavior? Does the comparison change with 
differing market parameters such as shapes of curves, number of traders, equilibrium volume, and 
time period for which markets are open? What is the impact on relative profits, market efficiency, 
speed of adjustment, price variability, bidding behavior, timing of contracts, etc.? A staggering 
number of questions can be posed. However, at this time the relevance of these questions has not 
been established. No doubt as theory advances and use of the process occurs, issues can be posed, 
which will serve as priority guides through the maze of potential questions and comparative 
analyses will develop. For now the investigation is restricted to a discussion of a potential tool. 
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THE MUDA RULES 
The process can be implemented orally or by computer. Rules for the computerized 
version are the same but since screen displays, infonnation, etc., are important, the interested reader 
should request the appropriate software package (Johnson, Lee, Plott, 1988). The rules for the oral 
process are as follows.4 (1) Traders verbally tender "bids" to buy and "asks" to sell. (2) If the
trader is a buyer, the tender is submitted in the following sequence: "(trader number) BIDS (price) 
FOR (quantity) UNITS." If the trader is a seller, the word BIDS is replaced by ASKS. (3) A trader
is recognized by the auctioneer and the bid/ask is formally tendered and becomes the floor bid/ask. 
( 4) The replacement rule is lexicographic. If a bid price is higher than that of the tender on the
floor, the floor bid is replaced by the new bid regardless of the quantity of units. If the bid price is 
not higher than the floor bid, the bid is rejected by the auctioneer. A replaced bid is considered 
canceled and is dropped from further consideration. Similarly, if the price of a tendered ask is lower 
than the floor ask, it replaces the floor ask regardless of the quantities. (5) Contracts can be made 
for all or part of the floor bid by saying, "ACCEPT: (number) ACCEPTS (quantity) UNITS OF 
THE BID." An ask is accepted similarly by replacing the word "bid" with "ask." (6) If the total
quantity of bid or ask is accepted, then the floor is open for both new bids and asks at any level. 
(7) If part of the bid quantity is accepted, the remainder stands as the floor bid which can be 
accepted or replaced by a higher bid. However, no ask is outstanding and the floor is open for new 
asks at any level. (8) If part of an ask quantity is accepted, the remainder stands as the floor ask, 
which can be accepted or replaced by a lower ask. However, no bid is outstanding and the floor is 
open for new bids at any level. 
The logistics of the auctioneer involve a sequence. Bids and asks are tendered verbally. 
The auctioneer recognizes a trader by verbally repeating the trader number but not the quotation, 
and then enters the bid or ask on the chalkboard. The bid or ask is then repeated verbally by the 
auctioneer. After this voiced quotation, the floor is open for new bids or asks. An acceptance can
take place at any time after the bid or ask is written on the chalkboard. This procedure permits a 
space for acceptances and a brief period of standing for a bid or ask before new tenders can replace 
them. 
DEMONSTRATIONS OF OPERATION 
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The results of three experimental markets are included here as a demonstration of three 
important points. First, the logistics of the process work. The institutional features are internally 
consistent, understandable to subjects and experimenters, and foster exchange. Second, 
convergence of prices to near the competitive equilibrium occurs. Third, the process can move
units more rapidly than can the single unit double auction. Together the three constitute a 
demonstration that this new tool does the job that has been mastered by the traditional tool and does 
something important in addition. 
The general parametric configurations chosen for the experiments were "difficult" for 
convergence. In particular, individual demands and supplies changed every period. Even though
market parameters are constant, except for a single shift, the constantly changing individual 
parameters are believed to contribute to a high variance in market prices and thus a slow
convergence to equilibrium.5
In market 1 the aggregate parameters were constant for six periods; then demand shifted 
upward. The theoretical equilibrium volume increased from fourteen to nineteen units. In market 2
the aggregates were constant for six periods and then both demand and supply shifted downward 
keeping the theoretical equilibrium constant at fourteen units. The third market was a 
computerized market while the first two were oral. In the third market demand and supply were
stationary for the first ten periods at an equilibrium volume of fifty and then demand became fiat for 
thirty-five units and supply became flat for fifty units. The shift in the curves in all experiments 
occurred with no announcement of parameter changes. 
In Figures 1, 2, and 3 the equilibrating tendencies can be seen in all three markets. Al
trades are shown for the first two experiments. Because volume was so large in the third 
experiment, individual trades ecannot be shown. The volume is recorded on the figure for each 
period. In all three experiments prices converge to near the competitive equilibrium both before
and after the shift. Volumes in all three experiments are also near the competitive equilibrium.
Together these three experiments demonstrate the first two points. The MUDA facilitates trades, 
and convergence to near the competitive equilibrium can be expected. 
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The third point, that MUDA does something new, can be demonstrated by a study of the 
time involved. A natural differentiation here exists between oral auctions and computerized 
auctions. The periods in the first two oral auction experiments were four and one-half minutes long 
after the first two periods which were seven minutes and six minutes respectively. The rule of 
thumb for determining the time of periods for the single unit oral double auction is thirty seconds 
per equilibrium transaction. Thus, when the theoretical equilibrium volume was nineteen in 
market one, the market period would have been about nine minutes in the traditional single unit 
oral auction. According to this standard the oral version of MUDA can result in periods that have 
been reduced by 50 percent. This means that experiments with nearly twice the number of periods 
for a given amount of subject time can be conducted. 
Experiment 3 was a computerized MUDA. Table 1 shows the time pattern of units sold 
three periods before and three periods after the parameter change in experiment 3. In the table, the
five minute period is divided into fifteen second intervals. The first thing to notice is that
approximately fifty units are moved during the periods 9 and 10. Furthermore, the trading is not 
"cramped" in the sense that a few of the fifteen second intervals contain no trades and many 
intervals contain only one trade. In retrospect the period could have been reduced to three and
one-half minutes. By comparison the rule of thumb limit for period lengths for the (PLATO) 
computerized single unit double auction is eight seconds per equilibrium trade so the shortest 
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TABLE 1: Number of Units Traded by Period and by Fifteen Second Intervals 
Number of Period 
Seconds 
Elapsed 8 9 10 1 1* 12 13 
15 1 1  18 17 28 22 19 
30 10 5 6 8 6 7 
45 3 2 5 • 2 1 2 
60 3 6 6 1 2 0 
75 2 1 1 1 6 2 
90 6 2 1 0 0 3 
105 0 0 3 0 0 0 
120 2 1 2 0 0 0 
135 3 2 1 0 0 1 
150 0 1 1 0 0 1 
165 1 1 1 0 0 0 
180 2 2 1 0 0 0 
195 2 0 0 0 0 0 
210 0 0 1 0 0 0 
225 0 1 0 0 0 0 
240 0 1 1 0 0 0 
255 1 1 2 0 0 0 
270 1 0 0 0 0 0 
285 0 2 1 0 0 0 
300 1 1 1 0 0 0 
*A change in demand and supply occurred this period.
possible time allocated to move fifty units would have been about six and one-half minutes per 
period. Here again the periods can be shortened by a factor of approximately 0.5. 
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Perhaps the most dramatic demonstration of the difference occurs in the first fifteen 
seconds of period 11 of experiment 3. Notice in Table 1 that twenty-eight units are traded in this 
fifteen seconds. Twelve of these trades occurred in the first three seconds and involved two 
different buyers and two different sellers. These twelve trades wo.uld have been allotted over one 
and one-half minutes in the single unit computerized process and six minutes in the single unit oral 
process. Clearly compressing periods to three seconds might not result in interesting economics but 
the example demonstrates the relative speed of transactions. The MUDA is capable of moving 
volume faster than the single unit process. 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this note is somewhat different from traditional articles published in 
economics. The focus is on instrumentation, and research technology as opposed to general 
behavioral principles. The body of the note introduced a new tool and provided a demonstration 
which shows that the tool is capable of doing the job to which it is intended to apply. This 
concluding section contains some anecdotal and impressionistic accounts of things that might prove 
useful to those who might use the tool. 
When the process is oral, the experimenter should pay particular attention to the wording of 
tenders as described above. The sequence presented in the text has been successful in eliminating 
errors by the auctioneer and allowing the auctioneer to function smoothly. 
Subjects have a tendency to confuse the redemption value of a marginal trade with the 
value of a block trade. They sometimes think that the redemption value of the kth unit is the value 
they receive for a block trade of k units. Subjects can also become confused by the per unit price 
quotation and think the price is for the total of the units offered. Relative to the single unit double 
auction there is a tendency for subjects to buy or sell too much. They can lose track of the number 
they have traded. After a few rounds such mistakes are infrequent. 
Computerized versions have special problems. Typos can occur which with multiple units 
can cause immediate bankruptcy and possible tennination of the experiment. One solution to this 
problem is to tell subjects that no gains can be made from seizing the typo of someone else. They 
are encouraged to announce "typo" if they see one or make one. They are then allowed to cancel. 
If someone "grabs" one, the action can be appealed with the experimenter as a judge. If it appears 
to be a typo, the contract is canceled. 
8 
The source of the speed of the multiple unit process is not obvious. The current 
computerized one-unit processes (PLATO) require confinnation after a trade. This alone requires a 
few seconds per transaction. As it turns out, a large proportion of trades in the computerized 
MUDA process are for one unit. Tenders are frequently in blocks but acceptances tend to be in 
single-unit blocks because multiple unit acceptances are at risk of being rejected.6 It could be that
standby queues together with no requirement for confinnation in the PLATO markets would be just 
as fast as computerized MUDA markets. 
Aside from the fact that the MUDA can move units faster than single unit processes, it is 
not obvious that the processes differ. Differences might be observable under specific 
circumstances. For example, if the periods were made very short, the single unit process would be 
limited to a fixed volume which is known to have effects (Plott 1983). The MUDA leaves more
room for subject confusion and mistakes, so experimental procedures that have an impact on 
learning or instructions could have an effect. The quantities associated with tenders might carry 
infonnation thereby effecting the dynamics especially in markets with asymmetric information. 
The fact that the NY rule allows a single seller to "lock in" at a price might have some effects on
convergence-especially if other institutions like price floors are operative. However, nothing of 
behavioral differences between the single and multiple unit process has been documented to date. 
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Features of the MUDA invite questions. Why is the bid cancelled after only part of an ask 
is accepted? One answer is that this feature reflects a type of consistency in rules. The acceptance 
of the ask can be interpreted as a new bid which is also an improvement (increase) over the 
standing bid and therefore calls for the cancellation of the standing bid. A second answer reflects 
considerations other than consistency. If the ask is accepted by the same person who held the 
standing bid, as is frequently the case, that person may no longer be willing to be committed to the 
bid after having just traded. In order to deal with this new problem a technology for cancelling bids 
and asks must be added but cancellation can be used as a strategy to limit the tenders of others.7
Even if cancellation is possible, the original bidder must remember to cancel or must cancel quickly 
before someone else accepts the bid. On balance, the benefits of noncancellation over cancellation 
rules are not obvious. 
Why does price take priority over quantity? We are open for suggestions of alternative 
processes. The priority of price over quantity is a distinguishing feature of MUDA. Perhaps some 
alternative that gives more weight to quantity in the bidding process would perform better. 
Why are agents required to accept a partial filling of orders? Clearly MUDA could be 
altered to incorporate "all or none" offers. Our conjecture is that markets characterized by only "al
or none" tenders would operate less efficiently. Such contracts would appear to be less compatible 
with adjustments of tenders to the marginal units. Clearly tests of this conjecture or tests of related 
conjectures are possible should they be deemed of sufficient interest to justify the research 
expenses. 
The floors of the commodity markets and the stock markets are characterized by a host of 
detailed rules and customs. Some of these rules are in response to legal requirements as shaped by 
the beliefs of legislators and administrative law judges. Others might have evolved in response to 
the underlying economic characteristics of the goods and firms that are represented by the 
documents being traded. Still other rules might serve no functions at all. Elements of similarity
exist with the MUDA and the rules of exchanges but the MUDA was not developed as an attempt 
to simulate some existing market. However, existing markets might hold suggestions of 
modifications to MUDA or alternative rules that perform better than MUDA. 
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APPENDIXl 
INSTRUCTIONS 
GENERAL 
This is an experiment in the economics of market decision making. The instructions are 
simple and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions you might earn money which will 
be paid to you in cash. 
In this experiment we are going to conduct a market in which some of you will be buyers 
and some of you will be sellers in a sequence of market days or trading periods. Attached to the 
instructions you will find a sheet labeled Buyer or Seller, which describes the value to you of any
decisions you might make. YOU ARE NOT TO REVEAL TIIlS INFORMATION TO 
ANYONE. It is your own private information.
The currency in these markets is francs. Each franc is worth 
____ dollars to you. 
SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS TO BUYERS
During each market period you are free to purchase from any seller or sellers as many units 
as you might want. For the first unit that you buy during a trading period you will receive the 
amount listed in row (1) marked 1st unit redemption value; if you·buy a second unit you will 
receive the additional amount listed in row (4) marked 2nd unit redemption value, etc. The profits 
from each purchase (which are yours to keep) are computed by taking the difference between the 
redemption value and purchase price of the unit bought. That is, 
[your earnings= (redemption value ) -(purchase price)]. 
Suppose, for example, that you buy two units and that your redemption value for the first unit is 
200 and for the second unit is 180. If you pay 150 for your first unit and 160 for the second unit, 
your earnings are: 
earnings from first= 200 - 150 = 50 
earnings from second = 180 - 160 = 20 
total earnings = 50 + 20 = 70 
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The blanks on the table will help you record your profits. The purchase price of the first unit 
you buy during the first period should be recorded on row (2) at the time of purchase. You should 
then record the profits on this purchase as directed on row (3). At the end of the period record the 
total of profits on the last row on the page. Subsequent periods should be recorded similarly. 
SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS TO SELLERS 
During each market period you are free to sell to any buyer or buyers as many units as you 
might want. The first unit that you sell during a trading period you obtain at a cost of the amount 
listed on the attached sheet in row (2) marked cost of 1st unit; if you sell a second unit you incur the 
cost listed in row (5) marked cost of 2nd unit; etc. The profits from each sale (which are yours to 
keep) are computed by taking the difference between the price at which you sold the unit and the cost 
of the unit. That is, 
[your earnings= (sale price of unit) -(cost of unit)]. 
Suppose, for example, your cost of the first unit is 140 and your cost of the second unit is 
160. For illustrative purposes we will consider only a two-unit case. If you sell the first unit at 200
and the second unit at 190, your earnings are: 
earnings from first = 200 - 140 = 60 
earnings from second = 190 - 160 = 30 
total earnings = 60 + 30 = 90 
The blanks on the table will help you record your profits. The sale price of the first unit you 
sell during the first period should be recorded on row (1) at the time of sale. You should then record 
the profits on this sale as directed on row (3). At the end of the period, record the total of profits on 
the last row on the page. Subsequent periods should be recorded similarly. 
MARKET ORGANIZATION (MULTIPLE UNIT ODA) 
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The market for units is organized as follows. The trading.period is open for ___ minutes. 
Any person is free to bid, to buy (ask to sell) at any time that recognition is gained from the 
auctioneer. The bid (ask) is tendered by giving the sequence: name, bid price per unit (ask price per 
unit), quantity. The bid (ask) will be written on the chalkboard and will remain there until accepted, 
canceled or replaced by a higher (lower) bid (ask). Anyone is free to accept any part of a standing bid
(ask) and the remainder continues to stand. If a person accepts all or part of a bid (ask) a binding
contract has been closed and both parties must record the transaction. 
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APPENDIX2 
BUYER AND SELLER RECORD SHEETS 
Record of Purchases and Earnings, Buyer No. __ 
Unit Trading Period Pur- l 
ChaHd �umber 
6 8 10 9 11 t: 
l 1st llnit redemot ion value 
1 2 Purchase or ice 
) Profit 2) (row l - row a 
31 Total per period 
Naa•·------------------------ Soc. Sec, !lo. ______________ Total Pa)111ent. ____ _ 
Add re••· ----------------------------------------------------
Unit Trading Period 
Sold Number 
Selling price 
l Coat of lst unit 
Pro fir 
(row - row 2) 
· 28 S•lling pric• 
10 29 Coat of 10th uni 
30 Profit - ow 29 
31 Total per period 
Record of Sales and Profits, Seller No. 
_
_ 
_ 
1 2 ) 4 6 8 9 10 ll 12 
a 
llae. 
__
_______________________ Soc. Sec. !ID. 
__
_____________ Total Pe,.ent. ____ _ 
Addraa••----------------------------------------------------
15 
FOOTNOTES 
* The financial support of the National Science Foundation, the Caltech Program of Enterprise and
Public Policy, and the Caltech Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political Science is
gratefully acknowledged. We also wish to thank Mitch Loescher for his research assistance.
1. Volume refers to the number of smallest tradable units that are traded in a time period.
2. Computerized markets sometimes have this feature. See Smith and Williams (1982).
3. This market has been used by Lynch, Miller, Plott, and Porter (1986) and by Miller and Plott
( 1985).
4. The language used to convey these rules to subjects is included as Appendix 1.
5. Individual parameters for each period are not included because of space limitations. These will
be supplied by the authors upon request. 
6. Part of an order might be accepted before a multiple unit acceptance reaches the market. If the
amount of the order remaining is less than the amount listed in the acceptance, then the
acceptance is rejected. 
7. Suppose someone tenders a "high" bid that someone else would prefer to see withdrawn. An even
higher bid followed by an immediate cancellation will in effect cancel the original bid with a
minimum exposure of having the higher bid accepted. This strategy is called "flashing" in some
versions of MUDA and rules have evolved to control it.
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